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1 Introduction
Strategic negotiation theory has contributed signicantly to the understanding of negoti-
ation processes.1 Many inuential contributions analyze limits of vanishing costly delay
and some consider costless delay.2 Costly delay is often modeled as a risk of breakdown
or discounting. Negotiation models with costly delay have the property of continuity at
innity, a su¢ cient condition under which the one-stage-deviation property characterizes
subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) and SPE in stationary strategies (SSPE). This prop-
erty states that all one-stage deviations are unprotable. Negotiation models with costless
delay, however, lack continuity at innity, see e.g. Bloch (1996). Also, the playersex-
pected utilities fail lower semi-continuity in stationary strategies, a condition under which
Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2012) establish the equivalence between SPE and the one-
stage-deviation property in discrete extensive forms with perfect information. This raises
the obvious question whether the one-stage-deviation property still characterizes equilibria
under costless delay, which we consider to be stationary for explanatory reasons.
We show the necessity to address these issues by means of two motivating examples. The
most intriguing example is the symmetric hedonic game of coalition formation proposed
in Bloch (1996) and Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011) that has no SSPEs in pure strategies
under costless delay. We derive the symmetric SSPE in mixed strategies under costly
delay, and derive its limit under vanishing costly delay. Even though the SSPEs limit
strategy prole is well-dened, we show that it fails as an SSPE under costless delay.
Moreover, we show non-existence of symmetric SSPE in mixed strategies under costless
delay. Technically speaking, we show that the correspondence of symmetric SSPE strategies
lacks upper semi-continuity, may fail to be closed and may even be empty valued. A
puzzling phenomenon is that the symmetric SSPE converges to a strategy prole that
induces Pareto ine¢ cient perpetual disagreement, whereas the corresponding SSPE utilities
converge to Pareto e¢ cient utilities. Also puzzling is that the limit SSPE utilities are a
solution to the system of recursive equations, but fail to represent the correct expected
utilities. We provide an explanation for these phenomena and derive the necessary and
su¢ cient conditions that do characterize SSPEs in mixed strategies.
We address these issues in a general negotiation model in discrete time with an arbitrary
number of players, stochastic recognition of the proposing player, public and sequential en-
1Rubinstein (1982) boosted the literature on strategic negotiations. For surveys we refer to e.g. Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990), Muthoo (1999), Houba and Bolt (2002), Banks and Duggan (2006), and Ray (2007).
2Costless delay is analyzed in e.g. Binmore (1986), Perry and Reny (1994), Moldovanu and Winter
(1995), Bloch (1996), Banks and Duggan (2000), Dávila and Eeckhout (2008), Horniaµcek (2008), and
Herings and Houba (2010).
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dogenous voting orders, and discrete sets of feasible alternatives. We explicitly include
costly and costless delay to enhance studying limits of vanishing costly delay. Also, this
enables us to pin down the di¤erences between costly and costless delay. At any negotia-
tion round, one player is recognized to make a proposal. Proposals specify an alternative,
a set of players who have the right to approve this alternative, and an order in which
the players in this set sequentially and publicly vote. The rst vote against the proposed
alternative ends the current round of voting. After that, nature decides whether the ne-
gotiations permanently break down, or who will be next rounds recognized player. Our
models recognition rules represent more general institutions than analyzed in the liter-
ature so far and allow many special cases: Fixed rotating orders of recognized players
including alternating-o¤ers procedures; Markov recognition probabilities including station-
ary random recognition rules; and coalitional negotiation procedures including endogenous
protocols such as the rejector-becomes-proposer protocol in e.g. Selten (1981).3 The play-
erspreferences are represented by expected utility functions.
The main reasons to assume public and sequential voting in our model are that i) it
captures such voting rules of several negotiation models in the literature and ii) that, in
SSPE, such voting rules are equivalent to the stage-undominated voting strategies under
simultaneous voting rules as in Baron and Kalai (1993). So, our model implicitly obtains
the most appealing voting strategies under simultaneous voting. The endogenous voting
orders in our model extend upon the exogenous voting rules in the literature.
This class of negotiation models belongs to the class of recursive games with perfect
information, which is a subclass of stochastic games. Under costly delay, existence of an
SSPE is not an issue, since it follows from standard results on equilibrium existence in
stochastic games, see e.g. Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971). For the class
of stochastic games, Haller and Laguno¤ (2000) show that generically the set of SSPEs
is nite, and Herings and Peeters (2004) show that generically there is an odd number of
SSPEs. For stochastic games under costless delay, using the average reward criterion to
evaluate payo¤ streams, non-existence of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies has been
noted by Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) and has spurred an extensive literature seeking
existence of weaker notions of Nash equilibrium in special classes of stochastic games and
conditions under which SPE exist. For "-Nash equilibria, existence has been shown by
Mertens and Neyman (1981) for two-person zero-sum stochastic games and by Vieille
3In terms of institutions, we encompass models analyzed by e.g., Selten (1981), Rubinstein (1982),
Haller (1986), Sutton (1986), Binmore (1987), Hoel (1987), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Chatterjee et al.
(1993), Moldovanu and Winter (1995), Bloch (1996), Muthoo (1999), Banks and Duggan (2000, 2006),
Kalandrakis (2004a), Horniaµcek (2008), Britz et al. (2010), Herings and Predtetchinski (2010), Bloch and
Diamantoudi (2011) and Duggan (2011).
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(2000a, 2000b, and 2000c), for general two-player stochastic games. A general result for
stochastic games with three or more players is lacking thus far. For the subclass of recursive
games with non-negative utilities, Flesch et al. (2010) have demonstrated the existence of a
subgame-perfect "-equilibrium for every " > 0. For a class of coalitional bargaining models
that belong to the class of negotiation models we consider, Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011)
derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of pure SSPEs under costless
delay. General conditions for existence of mixed SSPE in stochastic recursive games is an
open issue.
Under costly delay, the one-stage-deviation property is equivalent to dynamic program-
ming, which can be separated into the optimality conditions and the recursive equations.4
Both characterize SSPE strategy proles and their conditional expected utilities. For
costless delay, we denote strategy proles that satisfy the optimality conditions and the re-
cursive equations as quasi SSPE. Quasi SSPE always exist, but as our motivating examples
show these may fail to be SSPE.
We will now summarize our main results. Our rst main result states exclusion of
perpetual disagreement is the necessary and su¢ cient condition such that the expected
utilities induced by a stationary strategy prole constitute the unique solution to the
recursive equations. The explanation is as follows: Stationary strategy proles induce a
Markov process and the corresponding expected utilities can be expressed in terms of this
process. These utilities always satisfy the recursive equations, but it is not the case that
any solution to the recursive equations corresponds to the expected utilities. The Markov
process has absorbing states that either represent which agreement has been reached or
represent permanent breakdown. This process might cycle forever on the other states,
which represent who is recognized. Such cycling is excluded by the necessary and su¢ cient
condition. Of course, under costly delay, the positive risk of breakdown excludes forever
cycling a priori, and then the recursive equations admit a unique solution. Only under
costless delay it may occur that the optimality conditions return stationary strategy proles
with forever cycling, called perpetual disagreement from here on, and then the recursive
equations have the entire Null space as its solution, which is of dimension one or higher.
Indeed, this is the case in one of our examples: the limit symmetric SSPE induces perpetual
disagreement, which explains one puzzle for the limit SSPE.
Our examples illustrate that, in case of singularity of the recursive equations under
costless delay, dynamic programming is no longer su¢ cient to characterize the players
4This technique is rst pioneered by Bellman (1953) and Shapley (1953). For a survey of Markov
decision processes, we refer to e.g. Puterman (1994). In this literature, the optimality conditions and the
recursive equations are often integrated, but in our analysis it pays o¤ to keep these separately.
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best responses and, consequently, for SSPE. Our second main result provides a character-
ization of SSPE that is also valid when the recursive equations are singular. Given the
other playersstationary strategies, each players best response is the optimal solution of
a stationary Markov decision process with expected total rewards that are bounded. We
show that such decision processes are well-dened for our class of negotiation models and
that stationary best responses exist. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for station-
ary best responses require that, in addition to the conditions of optimality and recursive
equations, either an equalizing condition or a minimality condition has to be satised.
The equalizing condition is a necessary condition for a solution to the recursive equations
to coincide with the expected utilities induced by stationary strategies. The minimality
condition is needed to select among several expected utilities in case the optimality condi-
tions and the recursive equations return several candidates for the optimal solution with
di¤erent induced expected utilities. What is relevant for practical purposes, whenever the
recursive equations admit a unique solution, then both the minimality condition and the
equalizing conditions automatically hold. This is equivalent to a players stationary best
response against the other playersstationary strategies that, combined to form a strategy
prole, exclude perpetual disagreement.
In essence, SSPE requires that each players stationary strategy is a best response given
the stationary strategies of the other players. This means that all the necessary and suf-
cient conditions of all the stationary Markov decision processes of the individual players
together form the equilibrium conditions. A su¢ cient condition such that all SSPE strat-
egy proles exclude perpetual disagreement is the following: Every player is able to propose
some alternative and some coalition whose members all prefer this alternative to the status
quo. This is a mild assumption that relaxes the popular assumption of an essential bar-
gaining problem. It is also easy to check. Under this assumption, SSPE strategy proles
are equivalent to the optimality conditions and the recursive equations on the domain of
strategy proles that exclude perpetual disagreement. The latter automatically holds for
costly delay. Under costless delay, all strategy proles with perpetual disagreement have to
be discarded a priori and the resulting subdomain of strategy proles is no longer closed,
which is a technical problem in establishing existence of equilibria. Our existence result
for quasi SSPE is an inferior substitute for existence of SSPE.
Although SSPEs are popular in negotiation theory and are axiomatized in Bhaskar
et al. (2013), these are also criticized as being too specic. Our focus on SSPE obscures
that many of our results are more general than might appear. At the end of our paper, we
show that, by enlarging the state space, more general results can be immediately obtained.
Our results extend to SPE on the class of non-stationary strategy proles that can be
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represented as nite automata, which covers most of the relevant strategy space in many
negotiation models, see e.g. the discussion in Section 3.5 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
This class of automata includes the automata needed to apply the method proposed in
Shaked and Sutton (1984) to establish lower and upper bounds on the set of SPE payo¤s.
The enlarged state space can also capture multilateral contracting as in e.g. Gomes (2005)
and stochastically uctuating sets of feasible utilities as in e.g. Merlo and Wilson (1995)
and Duggan (2011).
This paper is organized as follows. After the introduction of the negotiation model and
discussing preliminaries such as dynamic programming, the one-stage-deviation principle
and quasi SSPE in Section 2, two motivating examples are discussed in Section 3. The nec-
essary and su¢ cient conditions such that the recursive equations admit a unique solution
are established in Section 4. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for stationary best
responses are derived in Section 5. In Section 6 the SSPE conditions are stated, a su¢ cient
condition that excludes perpetual disagreement in SSPE is proposed, and vanishing costly
delay is investigated. Section 7 discusses how our negotiation model incorporates several
inuential negotiation models and presents several extensions of our results. Section 8
concludes.
2 The Model and Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce our model before we discuss some preliminaries that identify
the technical issues to be dealt with and that are also necessary for the motivating examples.
The description of the model and the preliminaries are separated into two subsections.
2.1 The Model
Consider n  2 players who negotiate the selection of an alternative from m  1 alterna-
tives in the shadow of a status quo under sequential and public voting. Players are indexed
by i and belong to the nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng : The status quo is the outcome under
breakdown and it is denoted by q:
Proposals consist of an alternative and a voting order of a decisive coalition, i.e., a
group of players who have the right to approve in order for a proposal to be accepted.
Voting orders are permutations of groups of players that form decisive coalitions. The set
A = fa1; : : : ; amg denotes the nite set of feasible alternatives. We assume without loss of
generality that q =2 A. As in many inuential models, the recognized player is assumed to
cast a vote in favor of his proposed alternative and is excluded in the proposed voting order.
Formally, for C a proper subset of N , the collection  (C) consists of all permutations of
5
the players in C, and the set O  [C22N :jCj<n(C) consists of all feasible voting orders.
The non-empty set X i  AO denotes the set of feasible proposals of a recognized player
i. So, a proposal (a; o) 2 X i consists of an alternative a 2 A and a voting order o 2 O of
players that does not include player i. Our formulation allows for the possibility that the
set of decisive coalitions depends upon the proposed alternative.
Negotiations proceed in discrete time, where t 2 N denotes round t. At round t,
recognized player it 2 N rst proposes xt = (at; ot) 2 X it , after which all players in
the range C(ot) of ot sequentially and publicly vote in the order described by ot. Given
xt = (at; ot), alternative at is implemented if all players in C(ot) approve. Otherwise, the
rst voter in C(ot) against ends the voting in round t and alternative at is rejected. The
identity of the rst voter in C(ot) against is denoted by rt: If all players in ot approve, we
dene rt = 0: If rt 2 N , round t is concluded with a draw by nature that is modeled as a
compound lottery: First, nature decides with probability  2 [0; 1] whether the negotiations
proceed to round t+1. With complementary probability 1  the negotiations break down,
leading to the implementation of the status quo q: Note that it is standard to identify costly
delay with  < 1 and costless delay with  = 1. Second, in case negotiations proceed to
round t+ 1, nature recognizes player i at round t+ 1 with probability i (it; xt; rt) 2 [0; 1],
where
P
i2N i (i
t; xt; rt) = 1. Prior to the rst round, nature recognizes player i with
probability i 2 [0; 1], where
P
i2N i = 1.
The negotiation procedure ts the framework of multi-stage games with perfect infor-
mation, see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). It has n + 1 stages per round t 2 N under
the understanding that i) at most one player is active per stage and all other players choose
the trivial action do nothing ii) all players do nothing either after all players in C (ot)
have voted in favor or after the rst vote against. In terms of Maskin and Tirole (2001),
the multi-stage game is cyclical with cycle length n + 1. Stages are indexed (t; k), t 2 N
and k = 1; : : : ; n + 1. The recognized player proposes at stage k = 1, all other players
sequentially vote or do nothing at stages k = 2; : : : ; n and nature moves at stage k = n+1.
As soon as a proposal is accepted, the negotiations end and the draw by nature becomes
trivial.
To keep track of the voting behavior in the various stages k = 1; : : : ; n + 1, we dene
rt;k 2 C(ot) [ f0g as follows. Since there is no voting in stage (t; 1); we set rt;1 = 0. For
k = 2; : : : ; n+1, we dene rt;k = 0 if no rejection has occurred in stages (t; 2); : : : ; (t; k 1).
Otherwise, rt;k is equal to the rst player in C(ot) who rejected the proposal. Notice that
rt;n+1 = rt: Finally, rt;n+1 = rt = 0 implies that the proposed xt at round t is accepted
after which the bargaining ends and all players do nothing forever.
Histories are dened recursively for all t 2 N and k = 1 : : : ; n + 1. The history up to
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stage (t; k) is denoted ht;k. The initial history h0;n+1 = ;: For t 2 N, dene the history
at the rst stage of round t as ht;1 = (ht 1;n+1; it), the history at the second stage as
ht;2 = (ht;1; xt) ; and the history at stages k = 3; : : : ; n + 1 as ht;k =
 
ht;k 1; rt;k

. The
non-empty and nite set of all histories up to stage (t; k) is denoted H t;k and the set
of all histories is H = [(t;k)2Nf1;:::;n+1gH t;k. Since the negotiation procedure has perfect
information, histories dene subgames and vice versa.
Mixed behavioral strategies and strategy proles are dened in the usual way: i is a
function from the set of histories at which player i has to act into a probability distribu-
tion over the history-dependent set of feasible actions and i denotes the set of all such
strategies. A strategy prole is  2   i2Ni. Sometimes we write  = (i;  i). Any
strategy prole  2  induces cumulative probabilities that some agreement is accepted
prior to or at round t. For  2 ,  (a; t;; ) 2 [0; 1] denotes the cumulative probability
of reaching agreement on a 2 A at a round   t. For all  2 , these cumulative prob-
abilities are well-dened, non-decreasing in t, and bounded due to
P
a2A  (a; t;; )  1
for all t 2 N. Hence, for all a 2 A,  (a; t;; ) converges as t goes to innity and we de-
ne  (a;; ) as this limit cumulative probability:  (a;; ) = limt!1  (a; t;; ). Note
that  (q;; ) = 1 Pa2A  (a;; ) is the probability of perpetual disagreement plus the
probability of breakdown. In particular,  (q;; ) = 1 implies  (a;; ) = 0 for all a 2 A.
Players have expected utility functions. Player i derives utility from agreed upon al-
ternatives and the status quo alternative denoted by the numbers ui (a), a 2 A, respec-
tively, ui (q). Because expected utility functions are unique up to a¢ ne transformations,
we use the normalization ui (q) = 0 and ui = maxa2A[fqg ui (a)  0. Also, we dene
ui = mina2A[fqg ui (a)  0. Expected utilities are dened in the usual way. Finally, we
dene the set of all feasible utility proles as
U = convf(u1(a); : : : ; un(a)) 2 Rn j a 2 A [ fqgg;
where conv denotes the convex hull of a set.
In terms of cumulative probabilities, player is expected utility of  2  is given by
U i (; ) =
X
a2A
 (a;; )ui (a) : (1)
Note that (U1 (; ) ; : : : ; Un (; )) 2 U: In case  (q;; ) = 1, it holds that the expected
utility U i (; ) = 0. We assume non-negative utilities: For all i 2 N , ui = 0. As will
be made clear later, under costless delay this assumption ensures that each players best
response against arbitrary stationary strategies will be the optimum of a positive bounded
model in terms of Markov Decision Theory.
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Since we have a multi-stage game with perfect information, the concept of subgame-
perfect equilibrium (SPE) is appropriate. A strategy prole is an SPE if no player has a
protable deviation at any history.
Our main analysis deals with strategy proles that we call stationary strategy proles.
We rst dene an exogenous partition of the set of all histories, and then dene strategy
proles on this partition.5 The partition for non-trivial rounds is as follows: At stage (t; 1)
only the identity of the recognized player matters. At voting stages (t; 2); : : : ; (t; jotj+ 1),
the identity of the recognized player and the proposal xt matter. Formally, for i 2 N ,
x 2 X i, and k 2 f2; : : : ; ng, we dene
H (i) = fh 2 [t2NH t;1j h = (ht 1;n+1; i) for some t 2 Ng ;
H (i; x; k) =

h 2 [t2NH t;kj h = (ht 1;n+1; i; x; 0; : : : ; 0) for some t 2 N
	
:
A stationary strategy S;i for player i species S;i
 
ht;k

= S;i(ht
0;k) whenever either
k = 1 and ht;k; ht
0;k 2 H(i) or it holds that k 2 f2; : : : ; ng, ht;k; ht0;k 2 H(j; x; k) for j 6= i;
and x 2 Xj. Therefore, player is stationary strategy reects that bygones are bygones.
When player i 2 N is chosen as the recognized player, he chooses a history-independent
probability distribution over X i: When player i 2 N is chosen as a responder at stage
(t; k) ; he conditions his behavior only on the recognized player and the proposal made.
We denote (X i) as the space of probability distributions on X i and we dene recognized
player is randomized proposal as i 2 (X i) with i(x) as the probability that x 2 X i
is proposed. Similarly, we dene i (j; x) 2 [0; 1] as the probability that player i votes
in favor of the proposal x = (a; o) 2 Xj made by player j; where ki (o) 2 f2; : : : ; ng
denotes the stage at which player i votes according to the proposed voting order o: All
such probabilities form i = (i (j; x))j2N;x2Xj : A stationary strategy prole is denoted by
S = (; ), where  = (1; : : : ; n) and  = (1; : : : ; n). We write S =
 
S;i; S; i

,
where S;i = (i; i) denotes player is stationary strategy and S; i = ( i;  i) denotes
the stationary strategies of all players except player i. We denote player is set of all
stationary strategies as S;i and the set of all stationary strategy proles as S = i2NS;i.
Finally, an SPE in stationary strategies is denoted SSPE.
Player i 2 N takes a non-trivial decision either as the recognized player in states ofH (i),
denoted state i, or as a voter in states of H (j; (a; o) ; ki (o)), denoted state (j; (a; o) ; ki (o)),
where this player is the ki (o)-th voter after player j 2 Nn fig has proposed x = (a; o) 2 Xj
and all voters before player i approved. The set of all states where player i votes is denoted
5Maskin and Tirole (2001) dene stationary strategy proles as strategy proles on an endogenously
determined partition, which, depending on the negotiation protocol, may be coarser than the one we study.
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V i = f(j; (a; o) ; ki (o)) jj 2 Nn fig ; (a; o) 2 Xjg. Then, the nite set of states where player
i is active is denoted as Si = fig [ V i. Additionally, we denote V = [i2NV i as the set of
all states that refer to stages where one of the players casts a vote. Finally, S = [i2NSi
denotes the set of states in which one of the players makes a non-trivial decision.
2.2 Preliminary Results
The main motivation for our analysis is that SPE and SSPE are well understood under
costly delay and that open issues appear under costless delay. For costless delay, matters
are less straightforward and it will pay o¤ to focus on SSPE before considering SPE in the
class of nite automata.
For  2 [0; 1), existence of an SSPE is not an issue, since it follows from standard results
on equilibrium existence in stochastic games, see e.g. Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and
Sobel (1971). For the class of stochastic games, Haller and Laguno¤ (2000) show that
the set of SSPEs is generically nite, and Herings and Peeters (2004) show that generically
there is an odd number of SSPEs and they provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium
that would be selected by a generalization of the tracing procedure. Also for  2 [0; 1), the
one-stage-deviation principle, see e.g. Blackwell (1965) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991),
applies to characterize SPEs in our negotiation model. It states that, for any strategy
prole, SPE is equivalent to the one-stage-deviation property. Furthermore, SSPEs can
be characterized using dynamic programming techniques as rst pioneered by Bellman
(1953) and Shapley (1953). To formalize these dynamic programming techniques and the
one-stage-deviation property, we need to dene the state space rst, where we conne this
space to states where either players take non-trivial actions or states are absorbing.
Stationary strategy prole S induces a stationary Markov process on the state space
S [ A [ fqg, where A [ fqg is the set of absorbing states associated with having reached
either agreement a 2 A, or the status quo outcome q under breakdown. The matrices
denoted P S
 
S; 

, PA
 
S; 

and P q
 
S; 

assign transition probabilities, respectively,
from S to S, S to A, and S to fqg. We state the following result without proof.
Lemma 1 For  2 [0; 1], the stationary strategy prole S = (; ) induces a stationary
Markov process on S [ A [ fqg with transition probabilities

 
S; 

=
264 P S
 
S; 

PA
 
S; 

P q
 
S; 

0 I 0
0 0 1
375 : (2)
Moreover, all probabilities in 
 
S; 

are continuous in (; ) and .
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The initial distribution and these Markov transition probabilities determine the prob-
abilities of reaching states in S [ A [ fqg at the start of round t. These probabilities in
turn determine the cumulative probabilities 
 
a; t;S; 

. In order to state these probabil-
ities, denote S =

S
1
; : : : ; S
n

2 RjSj+ as the initial distribution over states in S, where
S
i
= (i; 0; : : : ; 0) 2 RjS
ij
+ , i 2 N .6 Notice that S puts probability zero on the voting
states V and that the probability on a state i 2 N is equal to i as specied in the previous
subsection. We state the following result without proof.
Lemma 2 For S = (; ), the probability that player i 2 N is recognized at round t 2 N is
the element of S P S  S; n(t 1) associated with s = i, i 2 N , the probability that alterna-
tive a` 2 A is approved in round t 2 N is the `-th element of S P S
 
S; 
n(t 1)
PA
 
S; 

and the probability of breakdown q at round t 2 N is equal to S P S  S; n(t 1) P q  S; .
Furthermore, the cumulative probability 
 
a`; t;
S; 

that alternative a` 2 A is ap-
proved on or before round t is the `-th element of
S 
tX
=1
P S
 
S; 
n( 1)
PA
 
S; 

:
Moreover, all these probabilities are continuous in (; ) and .
For nite t 2 N, all cumulative probabilities encountered thus far are continuous in the
stationary strategy prole S and  2 [0; 1]. Recall that, for all S and  2 [0; 1], the limit
probability 
 
a;S; 

= limt!1 
 
a; t;S; 

exists.
Given stationary strategy prole S and  2 [0; 1], player is conditional expected payo¤
in state s 2 S is denoted vi(s;S; ), which in vector notation is written as vi  S;  2 RjSj.
The following result is also given without proof.
Lemma 3 For stationary strategy prole S = (; ) and  2 [0; 1]:
vi
 
S; 

=
1X
=1
P S
 
S; 
 1
PA
 
S; 

ui; (3)
where ui = (ui (a1) ; : : : ; ui (am))>, and
U i
 
S; 

= S  vi  S;  :
Notice that all v (j; x; ki (o)), s = (j; x; ki (o)) 2 V , are determined by all v  s;S; ,
; s 2 N , through induction. This latter insight conforms with the common practice to
analyze negotiation models on the subset of states that can be reached at the beginning of
each round t, which is N [ A [ fqg.
6For convenience, when we discuss SSPE actions and the playersassociated values, we often restrict
attention to the non-absorbing states, i.e., S.
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2.3 Quasi SSPE and the One-Stage-Deviation Property
Given S; i, player is set of best responses consists of the set of all optimal strategies
of a stationary Markov Decision Process (MDP) in which the subset Si represents all
states where player i takes a non-trivial decision. For  2 [0; 1), each players MDP is a
well-dened MDP with discounting. Such an MDP always returns at least one stationary
strategy as one of the possibly many optimal strategies that can be either characterized
by dynamic programming techniques or by the one-stage deviation (OSD) property, which
says that a player cannot get strictly higher expected payo¤s by a one-shot deviation
in a single state, conditional on being in that state. For  = 1, each players objective
function corresponds to the expected total-reward criterion and matters become di¤erent.
Without going into details at this moment, each players MDP always returns at least one
stationary strategy as one of the possibly many optimal strategies that can be characterized
by dynamic programming techniques if some additional condition is invoked. Without the
additional condition, applying the dynamic programming techniques may lead to solutions
that do not satisfy the OSD property and should be regarded as quasi solutions. Whatever
 2 [0; 1], combining the MDPs of all the players together determines SSPE. In order to
be clear, we will make precise what we mean.
We dene solutions when applying the dynamic programming techniques without the
additional condition as quasi SSPE. Formally, an arbitrary conditional expected payo¤ for
player i in state s 2 S is denoted wi(s), which in vector notation is written as wi 2 RjSj.
We introduce the following denition.
Denition 4 For  2 [0; 1], the strategy prole S = (; ) is a quasi SSPE if, for each
player i 2 N , there exist values w = (wi)i2N such that
1. The optimality conditions hold:
i 2 arg max^i2(Xi)
P
x2Xi ^
i (x) wi (i; x; 2) ; s = i;
i (s) 2 arg max^i2[0;1] ^iwi (j; x; ki (o) + 1)
+(1  ^i)Pi02N  i0 (j; x; i) wi (i0) ; s = (j; x; ki (o)) 2 V i;
(4)
where wi (j; x; ki (o) + 1) = ui (a) if i is the last voter according to x 2 Xj.
2. The recursive equations hold: w 2 U jSj and, for every i 2 N;
wi = PA
 
S; 

ui + P S
 
S; 

wi: (5)
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The restriction w 2 U jSj is very natural and superuous for  2 [0; 1). However, for  = 1
the restriction rules out solutions to (4) and (5) with w =2 U jSj that lack any interpretation
in the motivating Example 8 in the next section. The following result states that quasi
SSPEs exist. We defer all proofs to the appendix.
Theorem 5 For  2 [0; 1], there exists a quasi SSPE.
The following result summarizes the discussion for costly delay and is stated without
proof.
Theorem 6 For  2 [0; 1), the one-stage-deviation principle applies and the sets of SSPEs
and quasi SSPEs coincide.
As mentioned in the introduction, our motivating examples reveal that some quasi SSPE
may fail to be SSPE. In those cases, we also observe that, for the quasi SSPE strategy pro-
le S, the values wi (s) of Denition 4 for states s 2 S di¤er from the conditional expected
payo¤s vi
 
s;S; 

in (3) for those states. The application of dynamic programming un-
derlying quasi SSPE wrongly suggests that we also satisfy robustness against one-stage
deviations. However, the OSD property for stationary strategy proles is the absence of
one-stage deviations that are protable with respect to the conditional expected payo¤s
vi
 
s;S; 

. The following denition makes this formal.
Denition 7 For  2 [0; 1], the OSD property holds for the strategy prole S = (; ) if,
for each player i 2 N , the optimality conditions (4) hold with wi equal to the conditional
expected utilities vi(S; ) given by (3).
When we compare the denitions of quasi SSPE and the OSD property we have the
same optimality conditions and that the main di¤erence is whether (5) or (3) is imposed.
We will derive conditions under which a quasi SSPE also satises the OSD property.
3 Motivating examples
We discuss two important examples in this section, where we restrict attention to sym-
metric strategy proles for explanatory reasons. The rst example, which is deliberately
oversimplied, illustrates some of the technical issues that arise in applying the conditions
of optimality and the recursive equations under costless delay. The second example illus-
trates that the symmetric SSPE under costly delay converges to a quasi SSPE as the costs
of delay vanish, but that its limit fails the OSD property under costless delay and, hence,
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fails as an SSPE under costless delay. Moreover, this example does not have any symmetric
SSPEs under costless delay.7
Example 8 Common-interest alternating-o¤ers bargaining
Consider bilateral alternating-o¤ers bargaining with two players, so N = f1; 2g, the set of
alternatives A = fa^g, the set of voting orders O = f(1) ; (2)g and, for i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i,
the set of feasible proposals X i = f(a^; (j))g. For each player, the utility of accepting a^
is 1 and the utility of the status quo q is 0. To obtain the alternating-o¤ers bargaining
procedure, we specify recognition probabilities i (j; xi; 1) = 1 for xi 2 X i. This example
is a special case of Muthoo (1991).
We consider symmetric stationary strategies: Recognized player i proposes (a^; (j)) with
probability 1. When it comes to a vote, player i approves a^ with probability  2 [0; 1]. Con-
ditional on being recognized, vp  vi(i; ; ) denotes the expected utility for the proposing
player. The conditional expected utility of the responding player in the role of a voter is
denoted vr  vj (i; xj; 2; ; ). We adopt similar notation for wp and wr.
Under costly delay, the one-stage-deviation property is necessary and su¢ cient for SSPE
and the denition of SSPE coincides with the denition of quasi SSPE. We rst derive all
quasi SSPEs for all  2 [0; 1] by solving
 2 arg max2[0;1]  + (1  ) wp;
wp =  +
 
1   wr =  (1  wr) + wr;
wr =  +
 
1   wp =  (1  wp) + wp;
plus the restriction wp; wr 2 [0; 1]. Since wp; wr 2 [0; 1] ; solving under  2 [0; 1) gives the
unique solution wp = wr = 1 and  = 1, which means a unique SSPE with immediate
agreement in every subgame. For  = 1, we obtain wp = wr = 1 and  2 [0; 1]. Further-
more, the restrictions on wp and wr exclude the class of bizarre solutions (wp; wr) > (1; 1)
and  = 0. Combining these results for all  2 [0; 1], these conditions result in a correspon-
dence of solutions in
 
wp; wr; 

-space that is non-empty and compact valued and upper
semi-continuous in  2 [0; 1]. Taking the limit as  goes to 1 is well dened.
The boundary solution  = 0 under costless delay is counter-intuitive, because it induces
zero probability of agreement in each round, i.e. perpetual disagreement, and according
to (3) each player has a conditional expected utility of 0. However, in the above solution
wp = wr = 1 6= 0. Moreover,  = 0 allows for a protable one-stage deviation and fails
to satisfy the OSD property. Clearly, the equivalence between the set of quasi SSPEs and
7Neither does it have asymmetric SSPEs, but we do not include the tedious calculations involved in
verifying this statement.
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the set of outcomes derived from applying the OSD property breaks down under costless
delay.
We provide the following insight why this occurs. Given an arbitrary stationary strategy
prole , agreement on a^ in round t is reached with conditional probability  2 [0; 1] per
round and, under costless delay, the negotiations proceed to round t + 1 with probability
(1  )t. Hence, for costless delay, the conditional expected utilities vp and vr are given by
vp = vr =
1X
=0
(1  )   1 =
(
0 if  = 0;
1 if  > 0;
which are discontinuous in . Consequently, recursive equations (5) and the conditional ex-
pected utilities (3) are no longer equivalent. Furthermore, conditional expected utilities (3)
always satisfy the recursive equations given by
vp =  + (1  ) vr;
vr =  + (1  ) vp; or
"
1    1
   1 1
#"
vp
vr
#
=
"


#
:
The matrix is non-singular and admits the unique solution vr = vp = 1 if and only if  2
(0; 1], i.e., no perpetual disagreement. Under perpetual disagreement, we obtain the entire
Null space (; ),  2 R, as solutions, which contains the conditional expected utilities
vr = vp = 0 associated with  = 0. So, the possible singularity of the recursive equations
causes a breakdown in the equivalence between quasi SSPE and the OSD property. A major
question is what conditions on the set of stationary strategies are necessary and su¢ cient
for non-singularity of the recursive equations. In general, this is the set of stationary
strategy proles that exclude perpetual disagreement.
In this example, even if  = 1; SSPE is equivalent to the OSD property. To see this,
solving
 2 arg max2[0;1]  + (1  ) vp;
vp =
P1
=0 (1  ) ;
vr =
P1
=0 (1  ) ;
yields vr = vp = 1 and the set of symmetric SSPE strategy proles given by  2 (0; 1].
Several observations follow. First of all, the set of strategy proles that satisfy the OSD
property and the set of SSPEs are no longer closed sets and, consequently, the correspon-
dence of SSPEs on the domain  2 [0; 1] in the  vp; vr; -space is not compact valued
and fails upper semi-continuity. As  goes to 1, the unique SSPE converges to an SSPE
for  = 1: In general, this needs not be the case. Second, characterizing each players
stationary best responses against the other players stationary strategy solves a stationary
Markov decision problem with expected total rewards when delay is costless.
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Example 9 Coalition formation
Consider negotiations between three players in a game of coalition formation. We have
N = f1; 2; 3g and three possible alternatives that are related to one of three possible
coalitions that may form: f1; 2g, f2; 3g, and f3; 1g. We have A = fa12; a23; a31g and
assume utilities are given by
u
 
a12

= (2; 1; 0); u
 
a23

= (0; 2; 1); and u
 
a31

= (1; 0; 2):
Players propose coalitions in which they are contained and decision making takes place by
means of majority voting. That isX1 = f(a12; (2)) ; (a31; (3))g,X2 = f(a23; (3)) ; (a12; (1))g,
and X3 = f(a31; (1)) ; (a23; (2))g. The utilities display a cyclical pattern that resembles the
Condorcet paradox in the sense that players 2 and 3 prefer coalition f2; 3g to f1; 2g,
players 3 and 1 prefer coalition f3; 1g to f2; 3g, and players 1 and 2 prefer coalition f1; 2g
to f3; 1g.
The formation of a coalition is determined by the rejector-becomes-proposer protocol
introduced in Selten (1981). Some player, say i 2 N , is selected randomly at the rst
round. This player proposes to one of the other players to form a coalition, either x+ =
(ai;i+1; (i+ 1)) or x  = (ai 1;i; (i  1)).8 It holds that i prefers the coalition with i + 1
to the coalition with i   1. If the player who is proposed to, say j 2 N n fig, approves,
the negotiations end with i and j forming a coalition. Otherwise, j is next in turn to
make a proposal, unless breakdown occurs. Thus, j (i; x; j) = 1 and j proposes next with
probability .
The stationary partition of the state space S of relevant histories can be characterized
as follows: i proposes, i is proposed to by i   1, and i is proposed to by i + 1. In this
example, we consider symmetric stationary strategies. Such strategies are summarized by
three probabilities, ,  , and +, where  denotes a players probability of proposing x+,
his most preferred coalition,   is the probability by which a player approves his less
preferred coalition and + is the probability by which a player approves his most preferred
coalition. It follows that a player proposes x  with probability 1 . A symmetric SSPE is
therefore denoted by (;  ; +). Conditional on being recognized, v  vi (i; (;  ; +); )
denotes the expected utility for the recognized player, v+  vj (i; (;  ; +); ) denotes the
expected utility of his most preferred partner j; and v   vj0 (i; (;  ; +); ) that of his
least preferred partner j0: We adopt similar notation for w; w+; and w : Clearly, it holds
that 0  v + v+ + v   3. In particular, perpetual disagreement implies v + v+ + v  = 0,
whereas for  < 1, v + v+ + v  = 3 holds if and only if agreement is immediate.
8We write i+ 1 or i  1 instead of i+ 1mod 3, respectively i  1mod 3.
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The following result is shown in the Appendix. The rst two cases cover  2 [0; 1) and
are derived by applying standard conditions of optimality and the recursive equations. For
 = 1, we rst apply these conditions to characterize a unique quasi SSPE, and afterwards,
for reasons similar to Example 8, we verify the OSD property. The unique quasi SSPE
fails the OSD property and, hence no SSPE exists.
Proposition 10
1. For all  2 (0; 1=2], the unique symmetric SSPE is given by (;  ; +) = (1; 1; 1)
with conditional expected utilities v = 2, v+ = 1, and v  = 0.
2. For  2 (1=2; 1), the unique symmetric SSPE is given by
 = 1;   =
  (1  2) +p(1  ) (1 + 2)
2
2 (0; 1) ; and + = 1;
with conditional expected utilities
v = 1= 2 (1; 2) ; v+ = 1; and v  = (1   ) = 1 
p
(1  ) (1 + 2)

:
3. For  = 1, the unique symmetric quasi SSPE is given by (;  ; +) = (1; 0; 1) with
values w = w+ = w  = 1. Moreover, there does not exist any symmetric SSPE.
We note that the non-existence of SSPE under costless delay arises because for each
stationary strategy prole some player has a protable one-stage deviation and the OSD
property fails.
For  2 [0; 1), the recognized player always proposes his most preferred coalition, i.e. x+.
A player always approves his most preferred coalition, i.e. + = 1. For   1
2
, a player
also approves his least preferred alternative, i.e.   = 1, and consequently, there is imme-
diate agreement with probability one on the recognized players most preferred coalition.
However, for  > 1
2
, a player randomizes when voting on his least preferred coalition, i.e.
0 <   < 1: Nevertheless, the recognized player forgoes the immediate agreement on x 
for sure and strictly prefers the risky proposal x+: In such an SSPE, negotiations end with
probability t 1 (1   )t 1   > 0 in round t and before termination we observe the fol-
lowing cycling behavior on the equilibrium path: rst proposer i proposes to i + 1, who
in turn proposes to i   1, who in turn proposes to i; and so on. Perpetual disagreement
occurs with probability zero. Since  < 1 means that delay is costly, the SSPE is Pareto
ine¢ cient without relying on features like asymmetric information or increasing cake sizes
over time as in Merlo and Wilson (1995).
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Figure 1: Expected joint welfare in Example 9 as a function of .
In Figure 1 we plot v+ v+ + v , and we observe an U shape on the domain (1
2
; 1), with
minimum around 2:60 at   0:81. When  goes to 1; v + v+ + v  goes to 3 with a slope
converging to +1. Although this limit exists and coincides with the unique symmetric
quasi SSPE, it fails as an SSPE at  = 1. The intuitive reason is that the limit SSPE
species  = 1;   = 0 and + = 1; so the players end up in perpetual disagreement with
probability one and each gets a conditional expected utility of 0 while recognized player
i can secure a utility of 1 by proposing x  to form a coalition with his least preferred
partner i   1. In general, for costless delay, the set of SSPEs forms a subset of strategy
proles that satisfy the OSD property, which in turn are a subset of the set of quasi SSPEs.
Since the unique symmetric quasi SSPE fails the OSD property, the set of strategy proles
for which the OSD property holds is empty and, consequently, no symmetric SSPE exists.9
So, the correspondence of symmetric SSPEs may be empty valued and, therefore, lacks
upper semi-continuity at  = 1.
For completeness, we mention that the limit value of the SSPE utilities is given by
v = v+ = v  = 1; which does not capture the limit situation of perpetual disagreement
with v = v+ = v  = 0: Similar as in the previous examples, the standard recursive
equations that determine v, v+; and v  in the symmetric SSPE are singular for  = 1
9Proposition 10 extends the non-existence result for pure strategies in Bloch (1996) at  = 1 to mixed
strategies. It also extends the non-existence result for pure strategies in Livshits (2002) at  = 0:99 to all
 2   12 ; 1. Proposition 10 states existence of SSPE in mixed strategies for this range of s.
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whenever the symmetric strategy prole induces perpetual disagreement. For  2 [0; 1],
these equations are given by
w = 

2  + (1   )w + (1  ) + + (1  +)w+ ;
w+ = 

  + (1   )w+ (1  )(1  +)w ; (6)
w  = (1   )w+ + (1  ) 2+ + (1  +)w :
At  = 1 and perpetual disagreement at  = 1;   = 0 and + = 1; this system is singular
and any (w;w+; w ) satisfying w = w+ = w  = ,  2 R, is a solution.
Example 8 might be criticized as being too trivial and of no practical relevance because
the limit SSPE qualies as an SSPE under costless delay. Example 9 shows that these
issues should be taken seriously and dealt with. This is the purpose of our study.
4 Expected utilities and recursive equations
The motivating examples show that the recursive equations might be singular under costless
delay and that this is an issue. And as will become clear later, non-singularity will turn out
to be crucial in our further analysis. In this section, we derive the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions such that the recursive equations are non-singular.
The recursive equations are well known in dynamic programming. These state that each
players expected present value in the current state is equal to the instantaneous expected
value in the current state plus the weighted sum over all future states of the state-dependent
present values in these future states times their probabilities. In our negotiation model,
the recursive equations on state space S are given by
wi = PA
 
S; 

ui + P S
 
S; 

wi; (7)
where the rst term expresses the instantaneous expected utility and the second term the
weighted sum over all future states. Obviously, the right-hand side is a continuous function
in S, , and wi. The following result establishes that the conditional expected utilities
of (3) satisfy the recursive equations.
Proposition 11 For i 2 N , vi  S;  in (3) is a solution to the recursive equations (7).
This last result implies that the recursive equations are necessary. The discussion in
Example 8 and 9 indicates that they are not su¢ cient. Su¢ cient conditions are derived
next. Before we do so, we report a mathematical result for later reference. Recursive
substitution of (7) implies
wi = lim
T!1
"
TX
=1
P S
 
S; 
 1
PA
 
S; 

ui + P S
 
S; 
T
wi
#
: (8)
18
Then, wi = vi
 
S; 

if and only if the second term of the right-hand side of (8) converges
to 0: The next proposition follows.
Proposition 12 For i 2 N , if wi is a solution to (8) such that
lim inf
T!1
P S
 
S; 
T
wi = lim sup
T!1
P S
 
S; 
T
wi = 0; (9)
then wi = vi
 
S; 

.
The recursive equations can be rewritten as

I   P S  S; wi = PA  S; ui and
these equations admit a unique solution if and only if the matrix I   P S  S;  is non-
singular. Then, wi =

I   P S  S;  1 PA  S; ui and, by Proposition 11, wi = vi  S; .
The key insights underlying our main result is to consider the necessary and su¢ cient con-
ditions of the opposite case, i.e., I   P S  S;  is singular. Singularity is equivalent to
a determinant equal to zero, and this implies that P S
 
S; 

has at least one eigenvalue
equal to 1. So, the matrix I   P S  S;  is non-singular if and only if all eigenvalues of
P S
 
S; 

are unequal to 1: Solow (1952) derives a simple condition that is applicable to
our negotiation model. This condition is related to irreducible matrices and their nest
decomposition. An jSj jSj matrixM  0 is irreducible if there does not exist an jSj jSj
permutation matrix  such that
M 1 =
"
~M11 ~M12
0 ~M22
#
;
where ~M11 and ~M22 are square and non-trivial, see Solow (1952).10 If a matrix is reducible,
then an appropriate permutation matrix exists from which the upper-triangular block form
can be obtained. In many cases it is possible to further decompose ~M11 or ~M22. A nest
decomposition of M consists of an upper-triangular block form whose diagonal blocks are
irreducible. A nest decomposition exists, see Solow (1952). For P S
 
S; 

; we dene the
nest decomposition into f blocks, 1  f  jSj, as
P S
 
S; 

=
266664
~P11
 
S; 

~P12
 
S; 
    ~P1f  S; 
0 ~P22
 
S; 
    ~P2f  S; 
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    ~Pff
 
S; 

377775 ;
where ~Pde
 
S; 
  0, d; e = 1; : : : ; f and d  e, denotes the (d; e)-th block or matrix in
this decomposition and all diagonal blocks ~Pee are irreducible square matrices. Notice that
10A non-trivial matrix has at least one row.
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a 1 1 matrix is trivially irreducible, also if its unique element is equal to zero. Denote all
states associated with ~Pee
 
S; 

as Se
 
S; 
  S: The following result characterizes the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions such that the recursive equations are non-singular.
Proposition 13 The recursive system of equations has a unique solution, equal to vi
 
S; 

;
if and only if each irreducible block ~Pee
 
S; 

, e = 1; : : : ; f , has at least one row sum less
than 1.
Proposition 13 states the necessary and su¢ cient condition such that the system of
recursive equations has a unique solution. This condition has the following interpretation.
If the initial state i1 2 Se
 
S; 

, then ~Pee
 
S; 

describes the transition probabilities
on the subset Se
 
S; 

. Because ~Pee
 
S; 

is irreducible, each state in Se
 
S; 

has a
positive probability of being reached within nite time. In case a state is reached with a
row sum less than 1, then there is a positive transition probability to some state outside
Se
 
S; 

, being either an absorbing state in A [ fqg or a state in SnSe
 
S; 

. In both
cases, the Markov process will never return to states in Se
 
S; 

: Therefore, within nite
expected time, the Markov process leaves the subset of states Se
 
S; 

. In case it transits
to a state in SnSe
 
S; 

, then the nest decomposition implies this state must be in
Se+1
 
S; 
 : : :Sf  S;  ; let us say a state in Se+1  S;  : Repeating the logic above,
the transition probabilities on Se+1
 
S; 

ensure the Markov process leaves the states in
Se+1
 
S; 

within nite expected time to either an absorbing state in A [ fqg or a state
in Se+2
 
S; 
  : : :  Sf  S;  ; etc. For e = f , the Markov process transits away from
Sf
 
S; 

within nite expected time to an absorbing state in A[fqg. So, even though the
Markov process might involve complex dynamics, the transition probabilities P S
 
S; 

on
S ensure that for any initial state in S we reach an absorbing state in A[fqg within nite
expected time.
In the proof of Proposition 13, we establish the equivalence between I   P S  S;  is
non-singular and the largest absolute value of eigenvalues of P S
 
S; 

is smaller than 1.
Then, the inverse matrix of I P S  S;  is given byP1=1 P S  S;  1. Moreover, these
results imply that limT!1 P S
 
S; 
T
= 0 and condition (9) holds. We therefore have the
following result.
Corollary 14 If I P S  S;  is non-singular, then vi  S;  in (3) is the unique solution
to (8) and limT!1 P S
 
S; 
T
= 0.
Note that if for all i 2 N the row of P S  S;  associated with s = i sums to 1, then the
Markov process cannot reach any of the absorbing states, including q, and it must cycle on
the states in S forever, which necessarily can only occur when  = 1. The reason is that
20
each player i randomizes over proposals that will be rejected with probability equal to 1
and no breakdown occurs. The following result reformulates this insight into the necessary
and su¢ cient condition under which the row of P S
 
S; 

associated with s = i, i 2 N ,
sums to less than 1; which we state without further proof. Before stating this result, we
denote the support of i by Supp (i)  X i:
Proposition 15 It holds that
P
s02S P
S
ss0 ((; ); ) < 1 for s = i, i 2 N , if and only if
 < 1 or for at least one x = (a; o) 2 Supp (i) it holds that j (i; x) > 0 for all j 2 C(o),
i.e., there is a positive probability that recognized player i proposes x = (a; o) and all players
j 2 C(o) approve x with positive probability.
For  < 1, the unique solution to the system of recursive equations is equal to vi
 
S; 

:
For  = 1, we must place additional restrictions on the stationary strategy proles S in
order to apply these equations. This condition trivially holds for stationary strategy proles
S that induce immediate agreement in every state s = i, i 2 N .
We note that many of the inuential bargaining procedures in the literature can be
captured by a matrix of recognition probabilities that is irreducible. For example, in case
all j (i; x; r) = i;j > 0, i; j 2 N , x = (a; o) 2 X i and r 2 C (o), correspond to time
invariant recognition probabilities, which includes the special cases of xed rotating orders
among all players and random recognized players. In general for such irreducible matrices
of recognition probabilities we will have that if the strategy prole S induces agreement
with positive probability in at least one state s = i, i 2 N , then there is a sequence of
states connecting every other state in N to state i that each have positive probability
of being realized. If that is the case, the set of absorbing states will be reached within
nite expected time independent of the initial state. In our general setting, the recognition
probabilities j (i; x; r) may also depend upon the proposal x 2 X i and the identity of the
rejector r 2 Nn fig. Therefore, there may be multiple matrices of recognition probabilities
that depend upon proposals and rejectors. Formally, for i 2 N; we choose xi = (ai; oi) 2 X i
and ri 2 C(oi) and dene the matrix of recognition probabilities
R
 
x1; : : : ; xn; r1; : : : ; rn

=
264 1 (1; x
1; r1)    1 (n; xn; rn)
...
...
n (1; x
1; r1)    n (n; xn; rn)
375 :
We have the following result.
Corollary 16 Let all matrices of recognition probabilities R be irreducible and  = 1.
Consider some strategy prole S: The system of recursive equations has a unique solution,
given by vi
 
S; 1

; if and only if there is a state s = i, i 2 N , such that some proposal
x 2 X i is proposed and accepted with positive probability.
21
We conclude this subsection by investigating the case in which the necessary and suf-
cient condition of Proposition 13 does not hold. Then, there is at least one e = 1; : : : ; f
such that all rows of ~Pee
 
S; 

sum to 1; and ~Pee
 
S; 

induces an irreducible Markov
process on the states in Se
 
S; 

that never leaves the states in Se
 
S; 

; i.e., an absorb-
ing set that is a subset of S: Moreover, ~Ped
 
S; 

= 0 for all d 6= e: Denote PAe
 
S; 

as
the sub-matrix of PA
 
S; 

associated with states in Se
 
S; 

, and similar for P qe
 
S; 

as the sub-matrix of P q
 
S; 

. For i 2 N; we denote vie
 
S; 

as the sub-vector of
vi
 
S; 

associated with states in Se
 
S; 

. Obviously, PAe
 
S; 

= 0; P qe
 
S; 

= 0;
and vie
 
S; 

= 0: However, the recursive equations are given by
wie =
~Pee
 
S; 

wie;
or wie = lim!1
h
~Pee
 
S; 

wie
i
in terms of (8). These equations admit the entire Null
space of I   ~Pee
 
S; 

as solutions, which contains wie
 
S; 

= 0 in accordance with
Proposition 11. Note that the Null space always contains the subspace spanned by the
vector (1; : : : ; 1) and any vector in any orthogonal basis for the Null space is proportional
to this vector. For the symmetric SSPE of Example 9, we obtain for the matrix associated
with linear system (6) that
lim
!1
264 0 0 (1   ()) (1   ())  0 0
0 (1   ())  0
375 =
264 0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0
375 : (10)
The matrix on the right-hand side is irreducible. If we denote this matrix as M , then
lim!1M  does not exist. The matrix I  M has a one-dimensional Null space spanned
by (1; 1; 1). This explains our nding that w = w+ = w  holds in this example. Moreover,
condition (9) holds if and only if wi = 0 and this condition rules out any (w;w+; w ) =
(; ; ) with  6= 0:
5 Best responses
In Example 8 we argue that the derivation of best responses against stationary strategies
by the other players is more involved under costless delay than under costly delay. Given
the other playersstationary strategies, characterizing a players set of best responses is
equivalent to solving a stationary Markov decision problem (MDP) and, under costless
delay, the expected total-reward criterion is appropriate. In this section, we characterize
each players set of best responses under costly delay and costless delay by applying the
theory of MDPs to our negotiation model.
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The following result states the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a best response in
stationary strategies against S; i. We also include the existence of such a best response.
Before we do so, we dene the set of all expected values that correspond to solutions of
the optimality conditions and the recursive equations as
W i
 
S; i; 

=
n
wi 2 RjSj+ jS;i and wi satisfy (4) and (5) given S; i
o
:
For the negotiation model, we have the following result.
Proposition 17 Let S; i and  2 [0; 1] be given. There exists a stationary best response
S;i for player i against S; i. Moreover, S;i is such a best response if and only if there
exists values wi 2 RjSj+ such that
1. The optimality conditions (4) hold for player i.
2. The recursive equations (5) hold for player i.
3. Either the equalizing condition holds:
lim sup
k!1
P S
 
S; 
k
wi = 0; (11)
Or the minimality condition holds: wi is a minimal element of W i
 
S; i; 

:
By denition of W i(S; i; ); the values wi are non-negative. Therefore, (11) guarantees
that (9) holds. The third condition then also implies that a stationary best response for
player i is equivalent to the conditions imposed by the OSD property for this player.
This result is important because it extends the standard approach for costly delay to
costless delay. Before discussing it, we derive another result that, similar to Corollary 14,
states that if the recursive equations are non-singular then the third condition also holds.
Corollary 18 Let S; i and  2 [0; 1] be given. If S;i and wi form a solution to conditions
1. and 2. of Proposition 17 and I   P S  S;i; S; i;  is non-singular, then S;i is a best
response to S; i:
For  2 [0; 1), the recursive equations are non-singular on the domain of stationary
strategies S;i, and by the last result, player is best responses are fully characterized by the
conditions of optimality and the recursive equations, which conrms standard theory. For
 = 1, one of two additional conditions is required, but as a consequence of Corollary 18,
only in case the optimality conditions return stationary strategies that induce singular
recursive equations. Without repeating the arguments of Section 4, non-singularity requires
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that all diagonal blocks of the nest decomposition of P S
 
S;i; S; i; 

have at least one
row sum smaller than 1. Then, PA
 
S;i; S; i; 
 6= 0 and the system cannot cycle forever
on the transient states in S. The need for an additional condition follows from Examples
8 and 9.
Puterman (1994) notes that equalizing stationary strategies drive the system to states
in which there is no opportunity for positive future rewards, which is exactly the case in
our absorbing states in A[fqg or when the process cycles forever on the transient states S.
In particular, for  2 [0; 1) cycling forever is impossible because of the positive probability
of a permanent breakdown.
Given S; i, Puterman (1994) also notes that taking the limit as  goes to 1 is well
dened. In fact, this is how existence of an optimal value under  = 1 in MDPs is shown.
What is di¤erent in a game theoretic context, as Example 9 illustrates, is that the entire
SSPE strategy prole S depends upon  and, hence player is MDP changes as  goes
to 1.
Proposition 17 does not rely on our assumption of non-negative utilities. By the theory
of MDPs in e.g. Puterman (1994), it extends to the class of positive bounded models. Then,
the stationary strategies of the other players, i.e., S; i, have to be such that player i can
reach at least one agreement associated with non-negative utilities, which is a condition
that we have avoided for explanatory reasons. In case S; i restricts player i to reach
only agreements with negative utilities, player is MDP has become a negative bounded
model for which similar results hold that need to be specied somewhat di¤erently. For
explanatory reasons, we have assumed non-negative utilities.
The linearity of the objective function in the optimality condition for i conrms the
standard wisdom that whenever the recognized player opts for a randomized i over X i,
then all x; x0 2 Supp (i) should have equal expected conditional utilities that are also
maximal among all feasible proposals. Formally, for x; x0 2 Supp (i) and x00 2 X i;
wi (i; x; 2) = wi (i; x0; 2)  wi (i; x00; 2) :
Similar, the optimality condition for i states that every voter has to consider the trade-
o¤ between his conditional expected utility wi (j; x; ki (o) + 1) from approving and the
conditional expected utility
P
i02S  i0 (j; x; i)  wi (i0) from forcing disagreement in the
current round. If wi (j; x; ki (o) + 1) is strictly largest, then it is optimal for player i to
approve with probability i = 1. If wi (j; x; ki (o) + 1) is strictly smallest, then player i
will disapprove with probability one, i.e., i = 0. In case wi (j; x; ki (o) + 1) =
P
i02N 
i0 (j; x; i)  wi (i0), any randomization over approving and disapproving is optimal. In
particular, whenever player i is the last voter for a proposal x; he approves for sure if
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ui (a) >
P
i02N i0 (j; x; i) wi (i0). Whatever voting stage ki (o) player i is in, the expected
continuation utility
P
i02N  i0 (j; x; i)  wi (i0) of disapproving acts as a threshold.
6 Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
The previous two sections revealed several issues that can be traced back to the possible
singularity of the recursive systems and the playersMDPs characterizing best responses
against stationary strategies. We have investigated both these issues in isolation. In this
section, we rst address the implications for the game theoretic analysis in the negotiation
model, then we derive several useful results for applications and nally we investigate
vanishing cost of delay and quasi SSPE.
The denition of SSPE states that each players stationary strategy is a best response
given the stationary strategies of the other players. This means that we have an MDP for
each player and all MDPs together form the equilibrium conditions. The following propo-
sition follows trivially from the stationary MDPs that characterize the playersstationary
best responses.
Proposition 19 For  2 [0; 1], the strategy prole S is an SSPE if and only if, for each
player i 2 N , there exists values w = (wi)i2N such that
1. The optimality conditions (4) hold.
2. The recursive equations condition (5) hold.
3. Either equalizing condition (11) holds,
Or the minimality condition holds: wi is a minimal element of W i
 
S; i; 

:
This result extends the standard approach to characterize SSPE under costly delay
to costless delay. Similar as in Section 5, we rst state an additional result in case the
recursive equations are non-singular.
Corollary 20 If S is a quasi SSPE and I  P S  S;  is non-singular, then S is SSPE.
For  2 [0; 1), the recursive equations are non-singular on the entire domain of sta-
tionary strategies S: We obtain that SSPE is equivalent to the conditions of optimality
and the recursive equations. For  = 1, the same two conditions remain equivalent to
SSPE on the subdomain of stationary strategies S for which the recursive equations are
non-singular, i.e., the subdomain of strategy proles that exclude perpetual disagreement.
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Only in case the rst two conditions return stationary strategy proles that induce per-
petual disagreement, one of two additional conditions is required. The need of additional
conditions follows from our motivating examples and we forego repeating the arguments
in Section 5.
In many negotiation models in the literature there exists an alternative that is strictly
preferred to the status quo outcome by all players, i.e., the bargaining problem is essential,
and every recognized player can propose this alternative. Then, perpetual disagreement in
SSPE is impossible. Assuming an essential bargaining problem is too restrictive and does
not capture the utilities of Example 9. We formulate a weaker condition that is easy to
check.
Assumption 21 For each i 2 N; there exists a proposal (a; o) 2 X i such that ui (a) > 0
and uj (a) > 0 for all j 2 C (o) :
This assumption includes all essential bargaining problems in case each player is al-
lowed to propose an alternative with positive utility for all players together with a decisive
coalition to approve this alternative, say N: Formally, for all i 2 N , the essential bargaining
problem species some alternative a 2 A for which uj (a) > 0 for all j 2 N , and for some
order o with C (o) = Nn fig we have that (a; o) 2 X i. In Example 9, every recognized
player has two feasible proposals with positive utilities for some pair of players (includ-
ing the recognized player) that forms a decision coalition and zero for the third player.
Therefore, Example 9 also satises Assumption 21. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 22 Let Assumption 21 hold. Any SSPE strategy prole S 2 S induces
a probability of perpetual disagreement equal to 0. Moreover, strategy prole S 2 S is
an SSPE if and only if S 2 S is a quasi SSPE that induces a probability of perpetual
disagreement equal to 0.
This result states that Assumption 21 rules out that SSPEs induce perpetual disagree-
ment. It implies that we may consider the subdomain of strategy proles that exclude
perpetual disagreement. Under costless delay, this subdomain is no longer closed and this
is technically speaking unfortunate in deriving results about existence of equilibria. As Ex-
ample 9 shows, the set of SSPE may be empty. In this example, the optimality conditions
and recursive equations identify a unique strategy prole that induces perpetual disagree-
ment as a candidate for SSPE, but given that this example also satises Assumption 21,
this candidate fails as an SSPE by our last result.
Our results extend the equivalence result between SSPE and the one-stage-deviation
property in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2012), who assume no moves by nature, to our
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negotiation model. For  2 [0; 1) and for  = 1 and the subdomain of S that consists of
stationary strategy proles without perpetual disagreement, the expected utility function
U i
 
S; 

is lower semi-continuous in S. In Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2012) this is ex-
actly the condition under which the equivalence between SSPE and the one-stage-deviation
property is established.
Proposition 22 is of practical relevance. Under Assumption 21, the standard approach
of computing SSPEs from the conditions of optimality and the recursive equations, i.e.,
computing quasi SSPE, is always available. Either these return strategy proles that
exclude perpetual disagreement and that automatically qualify as SSPE. Or, the conditions
return strategy proles that induce perpetual disagreement and that obviously fail as SSPE.
An application of these insights is already conducted in Herings and Houba (2010). They
study negotiations among three players who are randomly recognized and the entire class
of non-negative utilities that give rise to a Condorcet paradox. Their results are derived
from the OSD property of Denition 7. They report two robust classes of probabilities
and utilities, one for which a generically unique SSPE exists and one where non-existence
prevails. In the former class, SSPE strategy proles exclude perpetual disagreement and,
hence, the optimality conditions and the recursive equations su¢ ce for SSPE according to
Proposition 22. In the latter class, the OSD property returns strategy proles that induce
perpetual disagreement and that fail as SSPE.
It is common practice in bargaining theory to attach special meaning to the limit of
vanishing costly delay, see e.g. Binmore et al. (1986), or establish existence of limit pure
SSPEs, as in e.g. Muthoo (1991). We refer to the limit SSPE strategy prole after taking
the limit  goes to 1 as a limit SSPE. The following results are immediate.
Corollary 23 If there exists a limit SSPE strategy prole that induces a probability of
perpetual disagreement equal to 0, then it is an SSPE under costless delay.
Corollary 24 If there do not exist SSPEs under costless delay, then all limit SSPEs strat-
egy proles induce a probability of perpetual disagreement equal to 0.
The rst result provides a condition that is relatively easy to verify, but it requires
computation of the set of SSPEs under costly delay rst, which is impractical. As Example
9 shows, imposing Assumption 21 that excludes perpetual disagreement in any SSPE is
not strong enough in obtaining a limit SSPE without perpetual disagreement. Also, this
example has non-negative utilities, the key assumption in Flesch et al. (2010) for obtaining
existence of subgame-perfect "-equilibrium for every " > 0 for  = 1. Recall that Herings
and Houba (2010) report two robust classes of probabilities and utilities, one for which a
generically unique SSPE under costless delay exists and one where non-existence prevails.
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The second corollary implies that, for the latter class, introducing costly delay and studying
limit SSPE is futile if one hopes to establish existence of SSPE under costless delay.
There are several general existence results under costly delay that establish non-emptiness
and upper-semi continuity of the set of SSPE strategies, see e.g. Banks and Duggan (2000,
2006) and Duggan (2011). In these references, the set of alternatives is continuous and so
are the utility functions, but the negotiation procedure is less general than in our model.
Our results are complementary. As in Duggan (2011), we do not impose any restriction on
the shape of the utility functions to obtain existence of SSPEs under costly delay. How-
ever, Example 9 also indicates that upper semi-continuity of quasi SSPE is not su¢ cient
for limit SSPEs to be SSPE under costless delay. This insight is novel.
7 Discussion
In this section, we will demonstrate how to generalize our results. It turns out that our
assumptions and analysis capture the essence of very general models.
7.1 Related models
In this subsection, we illustrate how institutional aspects of several inuential bargain-
ing models can be seen as special cases of the model specied in Section 2. We rst
discuss the set of feasible proposals. In bilateral unanimity bargaining over a discrete
set of alternatives A,11 X i = f(a; ( i)) ja 2 Ag expresses that approval by the respond-
ing player  i 6= i is required. Unanimity bargaining can be modeled as X i  A 
fo 2 OjC (o) = Nn figg : The case of an exogenous voting order, say in ascending order, is
captured by: if (a; o) 2 X i, then o = (1; : : : ; i  1; i+ 1; : : : ; n). Majority approval implies
X i  A  fo 2 Oj jC (o) [ figj > n=2g, where voting orders are feasible if its voters plus
player i form a majority. In case player j is a veto-player, then x = (a; o) 2 X i with i 6= j
implies j 2 C(o): Or, in case player j is a dictator, then x = (a; o) 2 X i with C (o) = fjg
for all i 6= j reecting that other players may propose when being recognized but that
only the dictator is decisive, and x = (a; o) 2 Xj implies C(o) = ;; reecting that j does
not require approval from the other players. These special cases can be easily extended to
general collections of decisive coalitions as in e.g. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Banks
and Duggan (2000, 2006).
In many coalitional negotiation models, the recognized player proposes a coalition and
an alternative from a set of feasible alternatives that may be coalition dependent. In our
11For example, in case of a smallest money unit in van Damme et al. (1990) and Muthoo (1991).
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framework, voting orders induce coalitions, and coalitions induce feasible sets of alter-
natives. Let A (C)  A denote the set of feasible alternatives coalition C is allowed to
propose. Then, X i  f(a; o) 2 AOja 2 A (C (o) [ fig)g captures such coalitional negoti-
ation models. Although we maintain the assumption that recognized players automatically
vote in favor, voting by recognized players requires only a minor modication of an addi-
tional voting stage in the multi-stage game, which is conceptually similar. For instance,
revoking a proposed alternative as in the bilateral bargaining game of Muthoo (1990) can
be modeled as if the recognized player casts the last vote and X i = A f( i; i)g :
We now turn to popular recognition rules in the literature. These are captured as
follows: The bilateral alternating-o¤ers procedure imposes 2 (1; x; r) = 1 (2; x; r) = 1.
Fixed rotating orders of recognized players can be modeled similarly, for example the
innitely-repeated order 1; : : : ; n is captured by setting i+1 (i; x; r) = 1; where we write
i + 1 instead of i + 1 modn. Markov recognition probabilities are studied in Kalandrakis
(2004b), Britz et al. (2010) and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010, 2012). In this case,
the probability of player j being recognized in round t + 1 conditional on player i being
the proposer in round t is given by i;j: We obtain Markov recognition probabilities by
setting j (i; x; r) = i;j. Time-invariant recognition probabilities as in Binmore (1987) are
obtained as a special case in which all i;j are independent of the recognized player i. Nohn
(2010) assumes Markov recognition probabilities that depend upon the proposed coalition
C (o) [ fig, i.e., j (i; x; r) = i;j (o). Duggan (2011) assumes such probabilities to depend
upon the proposed alternative a 2 A; i.e., j (i; a; o; r) = i;j (a). Our framework integrates
both formulations by allowing that such Markov recognition probabilities depend upon the
alternative, the proposed coalition and even the voting order through the proposal x 2 X i,
i.e., j (i; x; r) = i;j (x) : Finally, we consider coalitional negotiation models. The rejector-
becomes-proposer protocol in e.g. Selten (1981), Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Kawamori
(2013) is that player r becomes next rounds recognized player, i.e., r (i; x; r) = 1:
7.2 Extensions
Our negotiation model can also be extended by enlarging the state space S. Formally, let
Z, jZj  jSj, be a nite set of state variables and denote z 2 Z. In each round t, the
state variable z 2 Z is publicly observed and species player i 2 N who is recognized
given this state, denoted by the function  : Z ! N . The set of feasible proposals becomes
X i (z) for i =  (z), the utility of proposal x 2 X i (z) becomes uj (x; z) for j 2 N and
the transition probabilities become i (z; x; r). Such an expanded state space would lead
to a stationary Markov process. Stationary strategy proles can be dened in the obvious
way on this state space and induce modied stationary Markov processes similar to those
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in Section 2.1. Once more, the crucial part of our analysis remains valid. For instance,
the conditions that ensure that the largest absolute value of eigenvalues of the matrix
with transition probabilities is less than 1 still requires that we do not have perpetual
disagreement.
Maintaining A is nite, the enlarged state space o¤ers an amazing number of important
extensions.
1. Stochastic utilities, as in e.g. Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Duggan (2011). Then,
our analysis extends upon assumptions as costly delay, exogenously given public and
sequential voting, and recognition probabilities.
2. General coalitional bargaining procedures, as in Chatterjee et al. (1993), Bloch (1996)
and Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011) in which coalitions leave after they form. The
state indicates which coalitions have formed (and their members left the game) and
what they have agreed upon. The players who did not join any coalition continue
the negotiations among them. These procedures are especially important in market
situations such as two-sided matching models and roommate problems.
3. Multilateral contracting processes that allow coalitions of agents to renegotiate or
rewrite earlier contracts and to merge with other coalitions, as e.g. Gomes (2005).
The state indicates which coalitions have formed and what they agreed upon.
4. SPEs on the class of non-stationary strategy proles that can be represented as nite
automata. As argued in e.g. Section 3.5 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), nite
automata cover most of the relevant strategy space in many negotiation models. The
state space Z then represents the virtual state space of nite automata.
5. The method proposed in Shaked and Sutton (1984). This method is widely applied
to establish lower and upper bounds on each players set of SPE utilities. If these two
bounds coincide for all players, we would have uniqueness of SPE utilities, otherwise
multiplicity. It corresponds to a class of automata with state space Z = S  N .
Then, the state z = (s; i) 2 Z indicates which player i 2 N is kept to his lowest
SPE payo¤. Under costly delay, we obtain as an immediate result that these bounds
always exist. As argued in Houba and Wen (2014), this method might also be applied
to establish existence of SPE under costless delay in the model of Herings and Houba
(2010), especially for parameter values for which no SSPE exists.
Our main results imply that all these extensions can be accommodated for as long as the
extended stationary strategy prole excludes perpetual disagreement under costless delay.
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We do note, however, that the models under 2. and 3. involve at most a nite number
of state transitions involving non-zero utilities associated with the formation of smaller
coalitions during the negotiation process. This causes no technical problems, because the
expected total rewards remain bounded.
8 Concluding remarks
The main results show that the equilibrium analysis of strategic negotiation models un-
der costless delay exhibits important subtleties. The main messages are: the recursive
equations admit a unique solution under costless delay if and only if the strategy prole
excludes perpetual disagreement; the conditions of optimality and the recursive equations
are necessary for SSPE but insu¢ cient; necessary and su¢ cient conditions are provided
such that these conditions characterize SSPEs under costless delay. Furthermore, care
should be taken when one resorts to limits of stationary equilibria under vanishing costly
delay. Our motivating example of coalition formation shows a unique limit SSPE exists,
but it is not an SSPE under costless delay and under costless delay no SSPE exists at
all. The underlying logic of our results is robust and allows for straightforward extensions
to similar negotiation models and even SPEs in the class of strategy proles that can be
represented by nite automata.
Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2012) show that lower semi-continuity of all utility func-
tions in strategy proles is necessary in order to have equivalence between the one-stage-
deviation property and SSPE. This identies lower semi-continuity as a necessity for well-
dened problems. Such an approach might suggest to discard problems that lack this prop-
erty. However, restricting attention to classes of economic models that are well-dened in
this way, discards important applications such as e.g. the negotiation model under costless
delay. Our study o¤ers an alternative approach in which the lack of lower semi-continuity
is acknowledged as a fact. Before conducting any equilibrium analysis, this lack is dealt
with by deriving necessary and su¢ cient conditions that restore the equivalence between
the set of strategy proles that satisfy the one-stage-deviation property and the set of
subgame perfect equilibria on a particular class of strategy proles, stationary and nite
automata in our case. This will not automatically resolve the non-existence of subgame
perfect equilibrium, but it provides a systematic and sound approach that includes taking
care of neglected aspects. Also, our study emphasizes the importance of properly dening
the one-stage-deviation property.
Banks and Duggan (2000, 2006) and Duggan (2011) provide general existence results
for a class of negotiation models with sets of feasible alternatives that consist of continuous
31
variables and discounting. They also establish non-emptiness and upper-semi continuity of
the set of SSPE strategies in the discount factor on the closed interval that includes costless
delay. So, the set of limit SSPEs as the discount factor goes to one is well dened. Such
properties also hold in our Example 9, the unique SSPE converges to some well-dened
limit, yet this limit fails to be SSPE under costless delay. The issues discussed in our study
are denitely not an artefact of assuming a nite set of alternatives. These issues also
show up in the multilateral contracting model of Gomes (2005) that has sets of feasible
alternatives that consist of continuous variables. In Section 4.2 of this reference, an example
is presented with a unique SSPE under costly delay. In the limit SSPE, the recognized
player passes the initiative with probability one and perpetual disagreement results. The
limit of the conditional expected SSPE utilities, however, exceeds that of the conditional
expected utility of perpetual disagreement, which is similar as in our coalition formation
example. Our results pin down what is going on: the limit SSPE should be seen as a
quasi SSPE that fails to be SSPE due to the lack of su¢ ciency of the recursive equations
condition. Our study therefore provides important foundations for further research on sets
of feasible alternatives that consist of continuous variables.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5.
Throughout this proof  2 [0; 1] is xed and we suppress  in our notation. The proof
consists of applying Kakutanis xed-point theorem to a mapping that maps any S 2 S
and w = (w1; : : : ; wn) 2 U jSj into S U jSj: For i 2 N , dene the function f i : S U jSj !
[0; ui]
jSj as f i(S; w) = PA
 
S

ui +P S
 
S

wi. Since f i(S; w) = PA(S)ui +P S(S)wi +
P q(S)0 and, for every s 2 S; the sum of all the components of row s of PA(S); P S(S);
and P q(S) together is 1, it follows that (f 1(S; w); : : : ; fn(S; w)) 2 U jSj: By Lemma 1,
the function f i is continuous.
For given S 2 S, in any state s 2 Si active player is conditional best-response corre-
spondence is : 
S  U jSj !  (X i) if s = i and is : S  U jSj ! [0; 1] if s 2 V i is
the set of maximizers of the linear program given by (4), where all of its coe¢ cients in
the objective function are continuous in S and w: By the Maximum Theorem for convex
programs, is
 
S; w

is a non-empty, compact, convex-valued and upper semi-continuous
correspondence. Stacking all correspondences and functions together into the correspon-
dence  : S  U jSj ! S  U jSj yields a correspondence that satises the conditions of
Kakutanis xed-point theorem. Hence, there exists a xed point
 
S; w
 2 S  U jSj:
Finally, by construction of the correspondence , each xed point
 
S; w

satises the
optimality conditions and the recursive equations and w 2 U jSj: So, each xed point is a
quasi SSPE. 
Proof of Proposition 10 Part 3
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We rst compute quasi SSPE and, afterwards, verify the OSD property. In any quasi
SSPE, recursive equations (5) translate into:
w = 2  + (1   )w  + (1  )+ + (1  )(1  +)w+; (12)
w+ =   + (1   )w + (1  )(1  +)w ; (13)
w  = (1   )w+ + 2(1  )+ + (1  )(1  +)w; (14)
and the optimality conditions (4) translate into the following implications:
2  + (1   )w  > + + (1  +)w+ )  = 1; (15)
2  + (1   )w  = + + (1  +)w+ )  2 [0; 1]; (16)
2  + (1   )w  < + + (1  +)w+ )  = 0; (17)
1 > w )   = 1; (18)
1 = w )   2 [0; 1]; (19)
1 < w )   = 0; (20)
2 > w ) + = 1; (21)
2 = w ) + 2 [0; 1]; (22)
2 < w ) + = 0: (23)
Since every quasi SSPE has to satisfy all these relations, we analyze which values of
(;  ; +; w; w+; w ) satisfy (w;w+; w ) 2 U; so in particular 0  w + w+ + w   3
and (12)(23). We establish the following claim rst.
Claim: + = 1. Suppose not, then there is an equilibrium with + 2 [0; 1): It follows by
(21) that w  2; which implies that w+ + w   1; so by non-negativity both w+ and w 
are less than or equal to 1. Now (12) implies
2  w = 2 +(1  )w +(1 )++(1 )(1 +)w+  (1+ )+(1 ) = 1+   2;
so both   and  are equal to 1: Implication (20) yields that w  1; a contradiction to
w  2: Consequently, the claim + = 1 holds.
After substitution of + = 1 in (12)(23), we establish a second claim.
Claim:  2 (0; 1]: Suppose to the contrary that  = 0: Now (14) implies that w  = 2; so
by (15) we obtain 2 = 2  + (1   )w   1; a contradiction.
We divide the remaining cases in six classes, and show that each one leads to a contradic-
tion, with the exception of class four.
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1. Suppose  2 (0; 1) and   = 0: Using (15) and (17) we obtain that 1 = 2  + (1  
 )w  = w : Moreover, (12)(14) lead to
w = 1; w+ = w; w  = w+ + 2(1  );
so w+ =  and 1 = w  = 2 + 2(1   ): Solving the last equation leads to  = 1; a
contradiction to  2 (0; 1):
2. Suppose  2 (0; 1) and   2 (0; 1): The system of equations (12)(14) is equal to
w = 2  + (1   )w  + (1  );
w+ =   + (1   )w;
w  = (1   )w+ + 2(1  ):
Adding up these equalities leads to
w + w+ + w  = (1   )(w + w+ + w ) + 3  + 3  3;
so w+w+ +w  = 3: From   2 (0; 1); (18), and (20), we obtain that w = 1. Substitution
of w = 1 in (13)(14) yields
w+ = ;
w  = (1   )w+ + 2(1  ) = (1   )2 + 2(1  ):
Adding up w; w+; and w  results in the equality 1 +  + (1    )2 + 2(1   ) = 3; so
 = 1=(1   ) > 1; a contradiction to  2 (0; 1):
3. Suppose  2 (0; 1) and   = 1: Since   = 1 we know from (20) that w  1: At the
same time we nd using (12) that w = 2+(1 ) = 1+ > 1; leading to a contradiction.
4. Suppose  = 1 and   = 0: Substitution of  = 1 and   = 0 into (12)(14) implies
w = w+ = w : Next,  = 1 and   = 0 combined with (17) imply w   1; and since
(w;w+; w ) 2 U implies w + w+ + w   3; we have w = w+ = w  = 1: It can be veried
that w = w+ = w  = 1;  = 1, + = 1 and   = 0 satises (w;w+; w ) 2 U and
(12)(23).
5. Suppose  = 1 and   2 (0; 1): Using the same derivation as in case 2, we nd
that w + w+ + w  = 3: Since   2 (0; 1); we nd by (18) and (20) that w = 1; so by
(13) that w+ = 1: Since w + w+ + w  = 3; we nd that w  = 1: However, by (14),
w  = (1   )w+ < 1; leading to a contradiction.
6. Suppose  = 1 and   = 1: By (20) it follows that w  1; but by (12) it holds that
w = 2  = 2; a contradiction.
Hence, we conclude that perpetual disagreement given by  = 1, + = 1 and   = 0
together with w = w+ = w  = 1 is the unique quasi SSPE. Note that the restriction
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(w;w+; w ) 2 U in Denition 4 excludes, in case 4,  = 1, + = 1 and   = 0 with
w = w+ = w  > 1, which is discussed in the main text.
The derivation of strategy proles for which the OSD property holds is similar, except
in case 4. There, an agreement is never reached, so v = v+ = v  = 0: Since  = 1; we nd
by (17) that 0 = 2  + (1   )v   1; a contradiction. So, there are no strategy proles
for which the OSD property holds. Hence, there are no symmetric SSPEs at  = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 10 part 1 and part 2
For  2 [0; 1), it holds that (;  ; +) forms an SSPE if and only if there is (w;w+; w )
such that the conditions for quasi SSPE in Proposition 10 part 3 are satised when all w,
w+ and w  are replaced by w, w+ and w , except of course those on the left-hand side
of the recursive equations (12)(14). Then, part 1 and 2 of Proposition 10 can be veried.

Proof of Proposition 11.
By (3), we have that
P S
 
S; 

vi
 
S; 

=
" 1X
=2
P S
 
S; 
 1#
PA
 
S; 

ui = vi
 
S; 
  PA  S; ui:
By rewriting this equation, we obtain the stated result. 
Proof of Proposition 13.
By denition, P S
 
S; 
  0 is a non-negative matrix with row sums of at most 1. So,
many standard results as in e.g. Solow (1952) (or the references therein) directly apply.
Let  (M) denote the largest absolute value of eigenvalues of a square matrixM  0 whose
row sums are at most 1. Then, we have
1. 
 
P S
 
S; 
 2 [0; 1] is real,
2. the sum
P1
t=0 P
S
 
S; 
t
exists if and only if 
 
P S
 
S; 

< 1,
3. if 
 
P S
 
S; 

< 1, then the inverse

I   P S  S;  1 = P1t=0 P S  S; t exists and
is non-negative.
For our negotiation model, 3 implies
vi
 
S; 

=
1X
=1
P S
 
S; 
 1
PA
 
S; 

ui =

I   P S  S;  1 PA  S; ui;
and then the following result is immediate:
A. If 
 
P S
 
S; 

< 1, then the unique solution of the recursive equations coincides with
vi
 
S; 

.
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The results in Solow (1952) relate conditions on 
 
P S
 
S; 

to row sums associated
with the irreducible diagonal matrices ~Pee
 
S; 

of the nest decomposition of P S
 
S; 

.
Then, the following results, which are translated from Solow (1952), hold:
4. If all rows of ~Pee
 
S; 

sum to 1, then 

~Pee
 
S; 

= 1.
5. If at least one row sum of ~Pee
 
S; 

is strictly less than 1, then 

~Pee
 
S; 

< 1.
For our purposes, we slightly extend these results. The converse of 5 states:
5. If 

~Pee
 
S; 

= 1, then all row sums of ~Pee
 
S; 

are at least 1.
Because all row sums of ~Pee
 
S; 

are bounded by 1, combining 4 and 5imply the following
two results:
B. 

~Pee
 
S; 

= 1 if and only if all row sums of ~Pee
 
S; 

equal 1.
C. 

~Pee
 
S; 

< 1 if and only if at least one row sum of ~Pee
 
S; 

is less than 1.
With respect to the nest decomposition of P S
 
S; 

: Since the set of eigenvalues of
P S
 
S; 

is equal to the union over all e = 1; : : : ; f of the set of eigenvalues of ~Pee
 
S; 

,
we have that 
 
P S(S; )

= maxe=1;:::;ff( ~Pee
 
S; 

)g: Hence,   P S  S;  < 1 if and
only if ( ~Pee
 
S; 

) < 1 for all e = 1; : : : ; f; if and only if at least one row sum of ~Pee
 
S; 

is strictly less than 1 for all e = 1; : : : ; f . 
Proof of Proposition 17.
Given that  < 1 is the standard case, we only provide a proof for  = 1. Given stationary
strategies S; i, all of agent is best responses have to be optimal in a MDP with the ex-
pected total-reward criterion, where such MDPs are dened in e.g. Chapter 7 of Puterman
(1994). In this reference, the class of positive bounded models is dened as those MDPs
that have at least non-negative reward per round and a sum of expected rewards that is
bounded. In our negotiation model, the total rewards satisfy U i
 
S; 
 2 [0; ui] because
player i only receives a non-negative utility at most once when the state moves from the
transient states S to an the absorbing states A[fqg and otherwise receives utility of 0 per
round.
By Proposition 7.1.1 in Puterman (1994), for each s 2 Si, the vector of optimal values
wi 2 RjSj can be supported by a stationary strategy and we may restrict attention to such
strategies. By Theorem 7.1.3 in Puterman (1994), the value wi 2 RjSj has to satisfy
wi (s) = supi2(Xi)
P
x2Xi 
i (x) wi (i; x; 2) ; s = i;
wi (s) = supi2[0;1] 
iwi (j; x; ki (o) + 1)
+(1  i)Pi02N  i0 (j; x; i) wi (i0) ; s 2 V;
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which can be separated into the optimality conditions (4) and the recursive equations (5).
Both existence and the necessary and su¢ cient conditions then follow from combining
Proposition 7.2.1, Theorem 7.2.3 and Theorem 7.2.4 in this reference. These results estab-
lish that the optimal wi  0 additionally has to satisfy either the minimal vector of values
in W i
 
S; i; 

, or lim sup
T!1
P S
 
S;i;S; i; 
T
wi = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 22.
Suppose not: S is SSPE and induces perpetual disagreement. Then, vj
 
i;S; 

= 0 for
all i; j 2 N . Consider the voting stages associated with the proposal (ai; oi) 2 X i such
that ui (ai) > 0 and uj (ai) > 0 for all j 2 C (oi) : The last voter of oi has a threshold
of 0: The optimality condition implies he approves ai with probability 1. The second-last
voter of oi also has threshold 0 and knows that his approval of ai followed by the last
voters approval will implement alternative ai, from which he derives positive utility. The
optimality condition implies the second-last voter in oi approves ai with probability 1.
By backward induction, in this SSPE with perpetual disagreement all voters in oi have
a threshold of 0 and will approve alternative ai with probability 1. So, player i as the
recognized player has a protable one-stage deviation, namely propose (ai; oi) from which
he obtains ui (ai) > 0 with probability 1. This contradicts that S is SSPE and induces
perpetual disagreement. 
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